Markets for technology in the knowledge economy by Arora, Ashish et al.
Ashish Arora is associate professor at the
Heinz School of Public Policy and Man-
agement, Carnegie Mellon University,
Pittsburgh, where he is research director
of the Carnegie Mellon University
Software Industry Center.
Email: ashishandrew.cmu.edu
Andrea Fosfuri is assistant professor of
strategic management at the Business
Department of the University Carlos III,
Madrid, and Research Affiliate at CEPR,
London, UK.
Email: fosfuriemp.uc3m.es
Alfonso Gambardella is professor of eco-
nomics and management at the
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies,
Pisa, Italy.
Email: gambardellasssup.it
All three have published in leading eco-
nomics and management journals, and
together were co-authors of Markets for
Technology: The Economics of Inno-
vation and Corporate Strategy (2001).
Arora also co-edited Chemicals and Long
Term Economic Growth. Gambardella
also authored of Science and Innovation
(1995), and co-edited The Organization
of the Innovative Activity in Europe,
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Markets for technology in the
knowledge economy
Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri, and Alfonso Gambardella
Introduction
It is now a commonplace that we live in the
knowledge economy. Like all cliches, this one
too is wrong insofar as it suggests that earlier
economies did not rely upon knowledge. If there
is something different about the economic sys-
tem that has characterised the majority of indus-
trialised countries over the last two and a half
centuries, it is arguably the increased impor-
tance of scientific and tech-
nological knowledge for
economic activity. No less
an economist than Simon
Kuznets himself argued that
the distinguishing character-
istic of modern economic
growth has been the system-
atic application of science to
economic ends. Indeed, we
submit that what distingu-
ishes the so-called “knowl-
edge economy” from earlier
eras is the increasing role of
knowledge as an economic
commodity, bought and sold
in markets for technology.
This article draws upon
a long-standing study car-
ried out by the authors for
quite a few years, and
recently published in a
book (Arora et al. 2001a).
The focus of this research
has been the study of the
nature and functioning of
markets for technology,
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namely of markets for intermediate technologi-
cal inputs, and their implications for business
and public policy.
With the advent of the corporate R&D lab-
oratory, especially around the end of the nine-
teenth century, leading firms in western Europe
and the U.S. began to develop their own tech-
nology. This has been epitomised for instance
by the firms-eye-view of twentieth century
American economic growth offered by Chandler
(1990). For Chandler, the
systematic application of
science takes place within
the more organised confines
of the firm, as the pro-
duction of new knowledge
is combined with its appli-
cation through mutually
complementary investments
in research, manufacturing,
and marketing.
This vision of knowl-
edge creation integrated with
knowledge use has become
inadequate for understanding
economic growth in the
twenty-first century. Over
the past 10 to 15 years, there
has been a rapid growth
in a variety of arrangements
for the exchange of techno-
logies or technological ser-
vices, ranging from R&D
joint ventures and partner-
ships, to licensing and cross-
licensing agreements, to con-
tracted R&D.
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Although we lack comprehensive
empirical measures of the increase in such
arrangements over time, all the available evi-
dence suggests that the trade in technologies
is more common than it was in the past. For
instance, Grindley and Teece (1997) point to
the increasing use of technology licensing by
companies such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard,
Texas Instruments, and AT&T during the
1990s. Moreover, today, a number of firms
and software products have emerged to help
firms manage their patent portfolios. Firms
specialising in the creation of new techno-
logy are now an important part of the indus-
trial landscape in many technology-intensive
industries. Finally, we have seen the
development of electronic and online market
places where technologies can be bought
and sold.
We are not suggesting that in-house
R&D in well-known corporations will be
supplanted by externally conducted R&D.
Rather, we are trying to understand the con-
ditions under which technology can be traded,
be it by established firms or by firms
specialising in the production of technology.
In addition to the diffusion of technology,
such transactions could play an important role
in fostering innovation. This is the case when
the developers of the technology lack the
resources necessary to commercialise it.
Without the prospect of being able to capital-
ise on their innovations by trading them,
many small technology-based firms would not
invest in creating new and useful techno-
logies. Moreover, as we shall argue here,
international markets for technology can be
an important mechanism for an effective
diffusion of technology in the developing
countries.
We begin with a tentative definition of
markets for technology and by summarising
the empirical evidence on the size and
importance of these markets. Section 3
focuses on the implications of the develop-
ment of technology markets for corporate
strategy. Section 4 deals with the role of mar-
kets for technology in fostering the inter-
national diffusion of technology. Section 5
concludes by discussing national policy impli-
cations in light of the globalisation of these
markets.
 UNESCO 2002.
Markets for technology
A tentative definition
In this paper we use the term “market” in a
broad sense. Strictly speaking, market trans-
actions are arm’s length, anonymous, and typi-
cally involve an exchange of a good for money.
Many, if not most, transactions for technology
which we have observed would fail one or the
other criterion. Often they involve quite detailed
contracts and may be embedded in technological
alliances of some sort. Thus, though we shall
often paint with a broad brush, contrasting mar-
ket transactions with processes inside a firm, it
is not to dispute the existence of hybrid forms
that characterise market transactions in tech-
nology but rather to sharpen the exposition.
Technology comes in very different forms,
and no general definition will fit. For instance,
technology can take the form of “intellectual
property” (patents) or intangibles (e.g., a
software program, or a design), or it can be
embodied in a product (e.g., a prototype, or a
device like a chip designed to perform certain
operations), or it can take the form of technical
services. We will not attempt to define tech-
nology, treating it instead as an imprecise term
for useful knowledge rooted in engineering and
scientific disciplines, which usually also draws
from practical experience from production. In
turn, this means that technology transactions can
take different forms, from pure licensing of
well-defined intellectual property, to compli-
cated collaborative agreements which may well
include the further development of the tech-
nology, or its realisation “from scratch”.1 Table
1 summarises our definition of the market for
technology in the form of a simple typology,
along with canonical examples for each case.
Our definition of the market for technology
is close to the one proposed by the US Dept.
of Justice in its Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property (US Dept. of
Justice 1995). The US Dept. of Justice defines
markets for technology as markets for “intellec-
tual property that is licensed and its close sub-
stitutes – that is the technologies or goods that
are close enough substitutes significantly to con-
strain the exercise of market power with respect
to the intellectual property that is licensed” (US
Dept. of Justice 1995, p. 6). Our definition in
2
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Selling software in Guangzhou, China, 2001. Richard Jones/SINOPIX-REA
FIGURE 1. The transmission of growth impulses.
Table 1 also encompasses what the Dept. of
Justice calls “markets for innovation”, which
are seen as markets for “futures” technologies.
These include arrangements in which the parties
agree to conduct activities, jointly or indepen-
 UNESCO 2002.
dently, leading to future developments of tech-
nologies that will be exchanged (or jointly
owned) among them. This is typically the mar-
ket for contract R&D and the various types of
technological alliances and joint-ventures.
In sum, a market for technology refers to
transactions for the use, diffusion, and creation
of technology. This includes transactions
involving full technology packages (patents and
other intellectual property and know-how) and
patent licensing. It also includes transactions
involving knowledge that is not patentable or
not patented (e.g., software, or the many non-
patented designs and innovations).
Some suggestive evidence
Markets for technology are not new. Lamoreaux
and Sokoloff (1997, 1999) have documented the
existence of an active market for patents in the
3
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TABLE 1. A simple typology of markets for technology
Existing technology Future technology or component for future
Horizontal market/transactions Union Carbide licensing Unipol Sun licensing Java to IBM; R&D joint
with actual or potential rivals polyethylene technology to ventures or other technological alliances
Huntsman Chemicals between rivals
Vertical market/Licensing Licensing of IP Core in R&D joint ventures or other technological
to non-rivals semiconductors alliances; Affymax licensing combinatorial
drug discovery technology to pharmaceutical
companies
US during the nineteenth century. However, it
appears that these markets declined after the
1920s, and have become reinvigorated only in
the last couple of decades.2 In Arora et al.
(2001a) we provide rough estimates of the size
and scope of markets for technology for recent
decades. Using systematic data on technology
transactions we found that the extent of tech-
nology trade has grown in the 1990s, and high-
tech industries like software, chemicals, and
electronics lead the growth of such markets.
Table 2 shows the total number and, in parenth-
eses, the value of such transactions, by indus-
trial sector, between 1985 and 1997. The value
of a transaction is calculated here as the sum
TABLE 2. The market for technology: number and value (millions of 1995 dollars) of technology transactions,
1985–97, by sector
1985–89 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total number
(total value)
SIC28 439 310 461 395 486 596 351 208 222 3496
(5809) (4102) (6101) (5227) (6431) (7887) (4645) (2753) (2938) (46,264)
SIC35 129 115 210 188 195 192 164 63 69 1360
(6280) (5599) (10,224) (9153) (9493) (9347) (7984) (3067) (3359) (66,211)
SIC36 234 190 310 316 366 415 326 135 151 2479
(10,971) (8908) (14,534) (14,816) (17,160) (19,457) (15,284) (6329) (7080) (116,227)
SIC73 143 207 360 334 363 610 770 405 424 3689
(1740) (2518) (4380) (4063) (4416) (7421) (9368) (4927) (5158) (44,881)
SIC87 11 9 45 253 156 73 34 22 17 707
(171) (140) (701) (3939) (2429) (1137) (529) (343) (265) (11,009)
All 174 209 468 523 560 540 545 289 293 3858
others (2781) (2901) (5471) (6373) (6549) (6354) (6658) (3342) (3156) (48,240)
Total 1130 1040 1854 2009 2126 2426 2190 1122 1176 15073
(27,753) (24,169) (41,410) (43,571) (46,479) (51,604) (44,469) (20,761) (21,956) (332,831)
Note: SIC28 = Chemicals; SIC35 = Industrial Machinery and Equipment; SIC36 = Electronic and Other Electrical
Equipment; SIC73 = Business Services; SIC87 = Engineering and Management Services.
Source: The data are from a commercial database provided by the Securities Data Corporation, the leading commercial
provider of such data. For more details see Arora et al. (2001a).
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of licensing and royalty payments, and equity
investments and R&D funding provided in
return for licensing rights.
Table 2 shows that there have been over
15,000 transactions in technology with a total
value of over $330 billion, implying an average
of nearly 1,150 transactions worth $27 billion
per year.3 Using data on royalty payments
received by U.S. firms, one arrives at a similar
estimate for the size of technology markets.
This consistency is reassuring and suggests that
the total volume of technology transactions is
of the order of $30–$50 billion per year. To
put these numbers in perspective, note that the
total R&D spending in the US, Japan, Germany,
4
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UK, France, Italy, and Canada was about $340
billion, and non-defence R&D spending was
about $300 billion in 1995. Thus, the value of
the total technology transactions is about 9% of
total non-defence R&D spending in the
developed countries. Although markets for tech-
nology are still in their infancy in many cases,
the value of the transactions is already substan-
tial. Our data also show, that the number of
these transactions has been steadily increasing
over time, with the exception of the last two
years in our sample (possibly reflecting incom-
plete reporting of transactions for these years).
Specific industry case-studies provide poss-
ibly the most compelling evidence of the
increasing importance of technology markets.
The chemical industry for instance is one in
which licensing of both product and process
technology has been widespread for many years.
Similarly, technology trade is becoming exten-
sive in leading high-tech industries such as
software, semiconductors, and biotechnology.
For instance, in semiconductors there has been
a significant growth of the so-called “fabless”
or even “chipless” companies, which specialise
in the design of self-contained, independent chip
“modules” and sell their designs to other com-
panies that design and manufacture the complex
chip in which the individual modules are
embedded. In addition, during the last decade
both licensing and cross-licensing deals have
risen significantly in this industry and the pro-
pensity to patent has increased in response to
the greater need to protect intellectual property
in such deals.4
Markets for technology and
corporate strategy
The effects of “missing” markets
for corporate assets
In order to understand the implications of mar-
kets for technology, it is useful to begin with
a more general discussion of missing markets
for assets that distinguish a firm from its com-
petitors. These assets include technology, pro-
duction expertise and facilities, strong brand-
name reputation, human assets, supplier net-
works and established marketing channels. To
be a source of sustained above-average perform-
 UNESCO 2002.
ance, resources must meet three criteria: they
must be valuable, scarce, and imperfectly
mobile (see Barney 1991). In other words, a
competitive advantage must be underpinned by
resources for which well-functioning markets do
not or cannot exist. So, the firm builds a sus-
tainable competitive advantage by having access
to assets that its competitors cannot reach. Simi-
larly, much of the thinking on technology strat-
egy has approached the problem by implicitly
or explicitly assuming that technological assets
cannot be directly bought and sold, and the
services of such assets cannot be “rented”.
What are the consequences of such a miss-
ing market for technology? The immediate
consequence is that the innovator must exploit
the technology in-house. That is, in order to
extract the value from the technology, it (or
rather its services) must be embodied in goods
and services which are then sold. Such goods
and services must have lower costs or command
higher prices, to deliver returns that are greater
than the competitive rate of returns.
Consider a case where a firm has de-
veloped a new cost-reducing technology for the
production of a certain good. In order to extract
value from the technology, the firm must use
it to produce the good. Not only does this
require the firm to have access to the comp-
lementary assets (such as land and physical
equipment, marketing channels, and so on), but
the returns would also depend on the volume
of output that the firm can produce and sell. If
the complementary assets are themselves not
traded in a competitive market, or if firms differ
in their access to them, then firms that have
superior access to these complementary assets
will be able to derive greater value from the
technology. Similarly, firms that can exploit the
technology on a bigger scale will be able to
derive greater value.
Following this logic further, larger firms
or firms with superior access to complementary
assets will have a greater incentive to invest in
the technology in the first instance. Taking this
one step further, firms investing in technology
would be well advised to also invest in the
complementary assets that cannot be easily and
efficiently acquired from the market. In other
words, as Teece (1986) put it, firms have to
invest in creating co-specialised assets to maxi-
mise their returns from developing new tech-
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nology. In sum, absent a market for technology,
a firm must often acquire other assets in order
to extract profits from the technology. Insofar
as these other assets are themselves expensive
and illiquid, well capitalised, large, integrated
firms that possess such assets have greater
incentives to invest in developing new techno-
logies (Nelson 1959). Conversely, smaller firms
face major hurdles in developing and commer-
cialising technology.
The situation is quite different when the
asset can be sold or rented. Complementary
assets need not be owned or even directly
accessed by the technology developer. The rela-
tive importance of complementary assets within
the boundaries of the individual firms dimin-
ishes compared to the existence of such comp-
lementary assets at the level of industries or
markets as a whole. Clearly transaction costs
or factors may increase the cost of acquiring
the complementary assets externally compared
to owning them in-house, even when such mar-
kets exist. In our book, we distinguish between
cognitive factors (such as context dependence
and absorptive capacity), contractual problems
and other market imperfections that can limit
the ability of firms to access external comp-
lementary assets. As these imperfections
become less important, then, to use Teece’s
terminology, the existence of complementary
assets at the level of markets or industries may
offset the lack of such assets at the level of
the firm.
Ultimately, a market for the asset provides
the innovator – a firm that has developed new
technology – with more options. Instead of
embodying a newly developed technology in
goods and services, a firm may choose to sell
or license it to others, or it may choose to buy
it from external providers rather than develop
it in-house. This does not mean that companies
would only acquire technologies from external
sources. Leading companies would probably
choose the right balance between external acqui-
sition and in-house development of techno-
logies, even though for companies with lower
in-house technological capabilities the existence
of external technology sources may be critical
to enhance their ability to produce and sell
more innovative goods. Similarly, a market for
technology assets does not mean that innovating
firms will become pure licensing companies,
 UNESCO 2002.
although several small (and not so small) firms
have been successful as specialised technology
suppliers. Rather, as we shall also note below,
the appropriate strategy in the presence of mar-
kets for technology depends on the efficiency
of markets for other types of assets, including
finance.
Moreover, in thinking about how a market
for technology conditions strategy, there is one
other industry level force that must be con-
sidered. Markets, particularly efficient markets,
are great levelers. A market for technology low-
ers entry barriers and increases competition in
the product market, which often implies a
rethink of existing strategies. In turn, this
implies that when there exists a well-functioning
market for an asset, such an asset cannot be a
source of sustainable competitive advantage and
firms have to look somewhere else for gaining
an edge over competitors.
Markets for technology and
strategies for appropriating rents
Teece (1986) identifies several factors that
determine a firm’s ability to appropriate returns
from an innovation: nature of technology,
strength of the intellectual property rights
regime, complementary assets, ease of repli-
cation, and ease of imitation. Appropriation
through licensing works best when a substantial
gap exists between replication and imitation
costs. If the technology is easy to replicate and
transfer but difficult to imitate, the innovator
can capture a large part of the rents simply by
licensing. Hence, when the underlying knowl-
edge base is sufficiently codified and not
context-specific, and intellectual property rights
are well defined and protected, licensing can
work well.
For instance, as we extensively discuss in
our book, there exists a very large market for
chemical processes and engineering services.
The development of chemical engineering
played an important role in developing more
general and abstract ways of conceptualising
chemical processes. As well, patents are thought
to work better in chemicals than in other indus-
tries. In addition, many processes, especially in
petrochemicals, are designed around a specific
variety of catalyst which can be kept proprietary
because of the difficulty of imitation from sim-
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ple structural analysis alone. The licensor can
therefore use the catalyst as a credible hostage:
failure by the licensee to respect the initial
agreement can trigger a cutoff in the supply of
the catalyst.
In a recent paper, Teece (1998) recognises
that the formation of markets for technology
might change this view. He notes that the
unbundling of intellectual property from pro-
ducts generates a new environment for knowl-
edge management where the focus is on how
to capture value from knowledge assets, even
though he warns that “% becoming a pure
licensing company not directly involved in the
production market and increasingly remote from
the manufacture and design of the product itself
can be a risky strategy %” (see Grindley and
Teece 1997). Since risk is sometimes worth the
additional reward, the innovator now has the
option to balance her ability to extract value
from the asset by embodying it in products and
services, against the transaction costs involved
in trading the technology. In this respect, licens-
ing is an option, not mutually exclusive with
self-production. Hence, with a market for tech-
nology, a firm needs to recognise what its core,
non-tradable and tradable competencies are.
Having done so, it can decide whether a given
discovery or technological competency is to be
exploited in-house or through licensing. In
many instances, firms might possess some “non-
core” technologies (in some cases, of very sub-
stantial value) which can be profitably licensed.
The decision on whether to exploit the
technology in-house or not depends on a num-
ber of factors. First and foremost, it depends
on the distribution of complementary assets. If
the firm has superior access to the complemen-
tary assets compared to its rivals, in-house
exploitation is clearly an attractive strategy.
Conversely, if the firm lacks the complementary
assets, it may consider selling or licensing the
technology. An important special case arises
when the technology in question is generic in
terms of its application, such as the case of a
general purpose technology. In this case, only
an extraordinarily large and well-diversified firm
will be able to satisfactorily exploit the tech-
nology in-house. Otherwise, it is far more likely
that the relevant complementary assets will be
more broadly distributed, so that licensing the
technology would yield higher returns.
 UNESCO 2002.
The foregoing highlights the importance of
the transaction costs involved in the markets
for different types of assets. If the transaction
costs of acquiring complementary assets such
as production and marketing capabilities are
lower than the transaction costs involved in sell-
ing or licensing the technology, an innovator
lacking the complementary capabilities may
nonetheless choose to exploit its technology in-
house. In fact, there are many factors that affect
transaction costs for technology exchange. Fore-
most among them are well defined and enforced
property rights. Property rights are easier to
define and enforce, and transaction costs for
technology licensing contracts are lower when
the knowledge is articulable (Winter 1987), and
can be represented in terms of general and
abstract categories (Arora and Gambardella
1994). Such representations reduce the context
dependence of the technology, freeing it up to
be used more generally and reducing the cogni-
tive barriers to technology transfer (see also
Von Hippel 1994).
Difficulty in valuation can significantly
increase transaction costs. Accurate valuation is
particularly important in cases where the firm
lacks downstream assets to commercialise the
technology. Current accounting practices and
norms, derived as they are from times where
measuring tangible and material assets was their
crucial task, have to be modified in order for
technology markets to flourish.
What is less well understood is the role
that technology markets themselves can play in
improving the accounting for intangible techno-
logical assets. A market for technology
improves the accuracy of any valuation attempt.
It does so in the most obvious way, by provid-
ing an objective measure of the value, if the
asset has been traded in the past, or if similar
assets have been traded. Needless to say, tech-
nology is highly differentiated, and its “price”
is likely to reflect factors that are idiosyncratic
to the buyer and the seller. Thus, any monetary
measure is likely to be imperfect. That said,
such problems are not unique to the measure-
ment of the value of technology. A flourishing
market for paintings by Old Masters, for
instance, shows that product differentiation and
idiosyncratic sources of value do not preclude
the existence of a reasonably well-functioning
market.
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Moreover, when investing in R&D, firms
are implicitly making such measurements, as do
investors when they value the firms in capital
markets. Markets for technology allow for the
possibility of valuing the contribution of
technology separately from the value of other
valuable assets the firm may possess. In turn,
such valuation may enable firms to specialise
in developing technology without necessarily
having to acquire downstream capabilities.
In addition to transaction costs, the de-
cision about in-house exploitation also depends
on the extent of competition in the different
markets in the “value chain” of innovation. For
instance, the innovator may face much greater
competition in the product market than in the
market for technology. In this case, the returns
from in-house exploitation are likely to be
small, limited by the ability of the innovator to
increase its sales and gain market share, typi-
cally a slow process. The innovator may face
much less competition in the technology market,
and may be able to extract much higher returns
there. These considerations led Qualcomm to
exit from producing handsets embodying its
CDMA technology and focus on technology
licensing. In the early 1990s, Qualcomm intro-
duced a wireless telephone technology, based
on CDMA technology (Code Division Multiple
Access), which was markedly superior to the
existing technology. It embodied this technology
into cellular phones (handsets) and grew rap-
idly, with a turnover of $4 billion, and a net
income of more than $200 million in 1999.
However Qualcomm has decided to drastically
refashion its business. Citing falling margins in
the CDMA handset operations, it divested itself
of manufacturing and focused on generating and
licensing its CDMA technology. On an annu-
alised basis, Qualcomm earned nearly $400
million in licensing and royalty in 1999, which
is slightly more than what Qualcomm spent on
R&D in the same year.
Markets for technology and
international investments
Not only are markets for technology important
for the generation and the diffusion of tech-
nology within firms, well-functioning markets
for technology strongly promote the diffusion
 UNESCO 2002.
of technology across countries. Markets for
technology promote division of labour and the
development of specialised technology sup-
pliers. Once a technology is developed, these
technology suppliers can sell it in other coun-
tries at a cost that is smaller than the cost of
developing the technology in the first place. In
this way, follower countries benefit from the
fact that an invention, a new technology, or a
new design, has already been invented else-
where, and therefore the cost of making that
invention has already been incurred in the orig-
inating country.
The chemical processing industry provides
an ideal example showing that the development
of an upstream industry of specialised tech-
nology suppliers improves access, lowers invest-
ment costs, and reduces barriers to entry in the
dowstream industry, with beneficial effects on
the aggregate investment in the latter. The story
is that beginning in the 1930s and continuing
into the 1960s, the modern chemical industry
in the developed countries (henceforth “First
World”) grew rapidly. This stimulated the
growth of firms that specialised in the design
and engineering of the chemical processes, the
so-called specialised engineering firms or SEFs.
In the 1970s, and especially in the 1980s, as a
modern chemical industry emerged in the less
developed countries (henceforth LDCs), it ben-
efited from the presence of the SEFs which
turned to sell their technologies to the chemical
producers in these countries as well. Simply
put, the growth of the chemical industry in the
first world created an upstream sector, which
later spurred the growth of the chemical indus-
try in the developing countries. The important
point is that the LDCs benefited from the fact
that the (fixed) cost of creating the SEF industry
had already been incurred in the First World.
Figure 1 summarises the effects that we
want to highlight here. First, the growth of the
First World market for a given chemical process
encourages the rise of engineering firms special-
ised in the design of chemical plants for that
process. This is the classical effect of the size
of the market on the vertical division of labour
in an industry. As Smith (1776) and Stigler
(1951) noted, when markets grow there are
activities that are more effectively performed
by specialist companies (suppliers). The latter
can serve a market that is larger than the market
8
123Markets for technology in the knowledge economy
(and hence the size of activities) of the individ-
ual downstream firms. This makes the suppliers
more efficient because of their greater potential
specialisation. By purchasing the input from the
more efficient suppliers, the downstream indus-
tries benefit from the fact that they acquire
the input at lower costs than if the individual
companies had to produce it by themselves.
The second effect is from the SEFs in the
first world to the size of the developing country
market. To understand this effect, suppose that
First World SEFs could not supply the LDCs.
Then, apart from relying on multinationals,
LDC firms would have to provide the services
themselves or rely on any domestic SEFs that
may exist. In either case, LDC firms would face
very high costs. As a result, there will be fewer
investments in chemical plants. Given the high
transportation costs for many chemical products,
this would imply slower growth of chemicals,
and of industrial activity more generally.
This simple story relies on the assumption
that the critical input, technology, is easily
“tradable” across countries. Clearly, applying
what one has learnt in one place in another
is not always easy, and technology transfer is
certainly not costless. Such costs are likely to
depend on the very nature of the knowledge
embodied in the technology, with tacit and less
articulated knowledge being more difficult to
transfer, but also on the “absorptive capacity” of
the recipient firm (Cohen and Levinthal 1989).
However, the important point is that the transfer
cost be substantially smaller than the cost of
developing the technology in the first place. It
is in this sense that the fixed cost of developing
or inventing the technology is paid by the indus-
tries or countries that emerge earlier (in our
case the chemical industries of the First World),
while the industries or countries that come later
(the chemical industries of the LDCs) pay only
the additional cost of adapting the technology
to their specific needs and uses rather than the
costs of inventing the basic principles in the
first place.
In fact, we have to make an important
qualification here. We are not saying that with
the SEFs the firms in the LDCs face low costs
of developing chemical plants, let alone that
their costs are lower than those faced by the
chemical companies in the First World, or by
the multinationals. The cost of setting up a
 UNESCO 2002.
chemical plant by a company from a developing
country may well be quite high, even when
there are the SEFs. But our point is that with
the SEFs it is smaller than if there were no
SEFs. In turn, this means that more investments
by these firms will take place than if there were
no First World SEFs acting as vectors of the
process technologies.
In our book, we provide quantitative esti-
mates of the importance of a division of labour
in the chemical industry, using data on nearly
140 leading chemical technologies. Our empiri-
cal analysis shows that investments in chemical
plants in the LDCs are greater the greater the
number of technology suppliers (SEFs) that
operate in the First World. Moreover, the effect
of the SEFs is greater for chemical firms from
the developing countries than for the multi-
national firms investing in the LDCs. This is
because the latter firms have greater internal
technological capabilities. Hence, for them, the
presence of the SEFs is relatively less
important.
To get a sense of the order of magnitude of
the impact of an upstream sector of technology
suppliers on the total investment of the down-
stream market, we estimated the effect of one
additional SEF in a typical process market on
the expected total dollar value of investment in
the LDCs in that process market. We found that
an additional SEF would increase investment by
about $3 million per year per country. For all
38 LDCs in our sample, the increase in invest-
ment in a typical process was of the order of
$114 million over a 10-year period during
1980–1990. Most of our markets already had
more than 5 or 6 SEFs; hence, the effect of an
extra SEF was not that big. However, simple
simulation from our estimations showed that the
effect of having one extra SEF in a market with
no SEFs or just one, was rather sizable. The
“value” of the SEFs is, as one might have
expected, higher when there are fewer of them
rather than in markets where there are already
quite a few technology suppliers.
In a somewhat different context, one might
have conceptualised the phenomenon discussed
here as international technology transfer.
Undoubtedly, the SEFs are important sources
of chemical technology, but many large chemi-
cal firms also transfer technology overseas.
However, chemical producers have to tradeoff
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the gains from selling technology against the
loss in actual or potential revenues from selling
the downstream products. On the other hand,
the SEFs provide the technologies with few
strings attached, and will sell their technologies
and expertise to all. In so doing, they have truly
helped create a market for technology, from
which many developing countries have ben-
efited. Thus, in addition to the classical gains
from productivity improvements, specialisation
and division of labour can have other benefits
for industrial and economic growth that are
sometimes overlooked.
Indeed, the fact that opportunities can be
transferred from the early movers to the late
comers is by no means confined to the case of
the SEFs. In a seminal paper, Rosenberg (1976)
described how automobile producers benefited
from the technologies and tools developed by
the machine tool suppliers for the bicycle mak-
ers in the nineteenth century. At a later stage,
these machine tool producers also helped
develop manufacturing industries outside the
US. Similarly, the textile machine suppliers of
Manchester promoted the diffusion of textile
technology to Japan, India, and China, and even
today the supply of textile machines by the
Italian machine tool producers to textile firms
in the LDCs is said to increase the competi-
tiveness of these firms against the very same
Italian textile manufacturers in their LDC mar-
kets.
“Global” markets for
technologies and national
policies
Markets for technology, like other markets, are
becoming global. In some ways, this is only to
be expected, given the reduced “transport” costs
and greater appreciation by even otherwise pro-
tectionist governments of the benefits of tech-
nology. Rapid advances in communications, the
Internet being only the most recent, have only
hastened the process of globalisation.
At the same time, it is natural that these
markets are far more likely to arise in large
and technologically and economically advanced
regions, not developing countries. But this also
means that the latter need not focus on
developing such markets. Instead, they can
 UNESCO 2002.
focus on developing institutions that will enable
their firms to participate more effectively in
them. The example of the Western European
chemical industry in the years after World War
II is a case in point. Prior to the war, the
industry was technologically far ahead of its
US counterpart. The disruption due to the war
and the rise of the petrochemical industry, and
the associated process technologies in the US,
ought to have provided the US chemical indus-
try with a decisive advantage over its European
rivals, whose expertise lay in coal-based pro-
cesses. Yet, in a period of a few years, the
German, British, and French chemical industries
had largely switched over to petroleum and
natural gas as basic inputs. The availability of
US-developed refining and chemical engineering
expertise made this switch possible. Further, the
SEFs played an important role in integrating
and supplying technology to European cus-
tomers. In the 1960s, the SEFs played a similar
role in Japan. Japanese industrial policy, which
tended to restrict access to the Japanese market
for foreign firms, was far more receptive to
foreign technology imports. Indeed, the policy
focus in this context was in creating the ability
to absorb and adapt foreign technology.
The point is simple and well known: global
markets tend to circumscribe the role of policy
in affecting market outcomes. For smaller coun-
tries like the individual European countries or
less-developed countries, the impact of their
own policies, if they are not coordinated with
those of other countries, is likely to be small.
For example, policies of smaller countries to
develop standards or other types of supporting
institutions are unlikely to induce the develop-
ment of technology markets on a substantial
scale. Similarly, strengthening or weakening
intellectual property rights will probably have
little effect on the global market for technology,
although this may affect the extent to which
technology flows into their country.
Policies for encouraging, coordinating or
controlling the markets for technology will be
most effective when they are developed by large
countries (e.g., the US), or by sets of countries
(e.g., the European Union). Such policies
require coordination among countries and super-
national interventions in international policy set-
tings. But it is precisely at this super-national
level that policy decisions are harder to make
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because of the many conflicting interests
involved, and the lack of strong enforcement
mechanisms. And this is why policies developed
by a large country like the US (e.g., in intellec-
tual property rights or the development of
standards) can have a strong impact on the
world development of markets for technology.
Likewise, the European Union can play a sig-
nificant role, especially if it can harmonise the
policies of the individual member states, and
avoid the adoption of different rules and stan-
dards by individual member states.
For most other countries, the key policy
question may be how to take advantage of the
growth in technology trade world-wide. This
will require encouraging the effective use of
existing technologies, rather than the creation of
new ones. As well, policies aimed at monitoring
international technological developments
increase in importance, as do institutions for
enhancing the efficiency of contracts and reduc-
ing search costs. In this view, countries may
increase their emphasis on the ability to identify
and select technology, and develop complemen-
tary capabilities.
In sectors where markets for technology
are developed, and technology can be traded
more effectively, countries or regions should
specialise according to comparative advantages.
This does not imply that countries should cease
to invest in research and development. Rather,
it implies that they should be more selective in
terms of the sectors and types of activities on
which they focus, at least in the short-to-
medium run.
It is well known that R&D and patenting
is concentrated in the wealthier countries. In
particular, the US and Western Europe have a
head start in terms of basic research and
developing “generic” technologies like semicon-
ductors and genetics. Their advantage lies not
only in being the first movers, but also in the
broader industrial base over which they can
apply these findings. These advantages are less
salient when technologies and products need to
be adapted for local uses and needs. If one
accepts that companies or industries located
“near” users have an advantage when it comes
to communicating with their markets and
acquiring the relevant information for adapting
the technologies, firms in other parts of the
world could seize this niche. Thus, even if the
 UNESCO 2002.
production of more basic technologies is con-
centrated, other regions can access these techno-
logies and exploit their own proximity to users
or their comparative advantage in developing
complementary technologies, as long as markets
for technology work well.5
These recommendations are not new and
in some quarters, are viewed as a prescription
for perpetual technological “backwardness”.
Some countries may resist such an international
division of labour in technology production and
adaptation. The reasons may range from
national pride to the willingness to control stra-
tegic technologies. Thus, some form of “not-
invented-here” syndrome, at the country-level,
is likely to operate. Whether justified or not, it
is important to know that where they exist,
markets for technology increase the opportunity
cost of such an attitude. Simply put, if others
have already paid the fixed cost of developing
technology, and competition among sellers
implies that the price of the technology is
related to the marginal cost of technology trans-
fer, a strategy of developing the technology in-
house and incurring the fixed cost all over again
must provide some additional benefits over mere
ownership of the technology. There is little
point in national policies aimed at “reinventing
the wheel” except where such reinvention is a
part of the process of building “absorptive
capacity” or as a part of a long-run strategy to
develop international technological leadership.
Second, in a dynamic setting the inter-
national division of labour, with implied
specialisation in technology production and
adaptation, means that countries specialising in
the latter need not give up the possibility of
becoming technology producers, at least in
some well-defined areas. For example, by start-
ing with a policy of developing technologies
complementary to those developed by some
leading areas or regions, the local firms and
industries may gradually learn about the basic
technology as well, possibly becoming the pro-
ducers of some key technologies (see also
Rosenberg and Steinmueller 1988). The Indian
software industry, for instance, started as a low-
end supplier of software components to the
major software companies, especially in the US.
There are signs that this strategy may gradually
bring at least some of these companies to
develop more complex product development
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activities (Arora et al. 2001a). A similar argu-
ment can be made for the Irish software compa-
nies, which seem to have improved their ability
to produce new software products in some
niches of the market (Arora et al. 2001b). In
short, in a dynamic setting, the pattern of
specialisation is not immutable. With luck and
hard work, the advantages of specialisation in
lower-end technological activities (adaptation)
could even become the springboard for a move
up the value chain. Learning through systematic
interactions with users and the technology pro-
ducers of more advanced countries may be criti-
cal for this process to occur.
Indeed, some countries, like Russia and
Israel and to a lesser extent, India, have rela-
tively well-developed scientific and engineering
infrastructures. However, they lack the market
size and the complementary technological and
economic infrastructure that could best exploit
their scientific and engineering infrastructure.
In this respect, they are similar to specialised
technology suppliers. A well-developed and glo-
balised market for technology will enable firms
from these countries to derive more value from
their investments in science and engineering by
supplying technology to those able to develop
and commercialise it more effectively. Here too,
one may encounter opposition from those who
would see this as “giving away the store”. Once
again, our objective is not to advocate specific
policies, for the appropriate policy will depend
on the specifics of the situation, but to highlight
the option that markets for technology embody.
Conclusions
This article, and the more extended line of
research from which it was drawn, has
attempted to answer questions such as, under
what conditions will technology resemble a
tradable asset, and, if it does, what will be the
consequences for the generation and use of new
technologies, for the diffusion of technology,
and for public policy and business strategy?
In trying to answer these questions, we have
confronted a variety of challenges. Markets for
technology are not easy to define. Technologies
often change hands through the capital or final
goods in which they are embodied. While our
 UNESCO 2002.
focus is on the sales of technologies disem-
bodied from physical goods, embodying or dis-
embodying the technology may be the outcome
of deliberate choice. Moreover, it is difficult to
make the distinction between knowledge and
technology.
A similar qualification applies to what we
consider to be a novel concept we have
developed here, namely the division of innov-
ative labour. In many respects, the distinction
between the traditional division of labour and
the division of innovative labour is not straight-
forward. But although there are important
reasons to distinguish between the two, there
are important commonalities as well: the proper-
ties and implications (e.g., for economic
growth) of vertical specialisation can extend
beyond the case of the manufactured goods to
specialisation in technology and the innovation
process. Thus, the division of innovative labour
yields the classic advantages of specialisation.
For example, in many leading high-tech indus-
tries today smaller technology suppliers show a
comparative advantage in creating new ideas
and technologies and the larger companies exhi-
bit a comparative advantage in developing and
scaling up these technologies, as well as in
manufacturing and marketing. Moreover,
specialised technology suppliers can be critical
in generalising and developing the innovation
for broad use and in diffusing the innovation,
as the specialised engineering firms (the SEFs)
have done in the chemical processing industries
for many years, including their role in fostering
market-mediated mechanisms for technology
transfer towards the LDCs, as we have tried to
highlight in this article. Particularly, the SEFs
have shown how the division of innovative lab-
our in an industry can lower entry barriers for
later entrants. Through a division of labour, the
growth of the market in one region can create
technology specialists that stimulate growth in
other regions.
At the same time, as we discussed in our
final section, the globalisation of markets for
technology entails new challenges for govern-
ments. In particular, we have noted that like
any global market, markets for technology too
imply a reduced capability of national policies
to fully govern them. Moreover, one implication
is that especially in follower countries, benefits
can arise from a policy encouraging national
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players to buy technologies in such markets, the internal development of technologies and
rather than attempting to develop them intern- the cost of adapting technologies available
ally. We are aware of the fact that there could from international producers. Our story of the
be drawbacks to this strategy. For example, it specialised engineering firms in the chemical
has been argued that internal investments in processing industries have indeed shown that a
technology are important for enhancing local market-mediated division of innovative labour
learning capabilities. We simply noted that the has been a powerful instrument for technology
advantages of these strategies have to be diffusion, and for the growth of the downstream
compared with the difference in costs between industries in the recipient countries.
Notes
1. Transactions in technology can
also occur through mergers and
acquisitions, and through the
mobility of people. However, we
shall ignore these cases here.
2. A study by the British
Technology Group (BTG 1998) has
concluded that most large firms in
the industrialised countries have
unused technologies that they have
not licensed in the past but would
like to do so. This points to the
under-development, if not absence,
of a market for technology.
Supporting evidence comes from an
estimate by the European Union
that, in Europe, 20 billion dollars
are spent every year to develop
innovations and technologies that
have already been developed
elsewhere. (See www.european-
patent-office.org/patinfopro/
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